George Edward Moore
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy · 2019 · Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
This source is used as challenges evidence across 1 linked claim and 3 related evidence hubs. Its citation record is marked verified; that verifies the source trail, not the truth of any linked claim.
Summary
Reference entry on G. E. Moore, including his common-sense realism and 'Proof of an External World'.
How this source is used on the map
Useful counter-anchor for solipsism because it shows the canonical common-sense reply and its limits.
Citation record
- Authors
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- Year
- 2019
- Publication
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- Source type
- Philosophy reference
- Map role
- challenges
- Credibility level
- primary
- Citation status
- Verified
- DOI
- Not recorded
- PubMed
- Not recorded
- Not recorded
Linked claims
Related evidence hubs
Related sources
A central philosophical challenge to solipsistic pictures of meaning, language, and private experience.
Places solipsism inside the broader skeptical tradition rather than treating it as an empirical worldview.
Use this as the philosophical background for solipsism and for disputed minds in non-human or artificial systems. It is context, not direct evidence that any specific entity is conscious.
Useful for separating serious philosophy of self from spiritualized higher-self language.
Useful general-audience entry point; the SEP 'Other Minds' entry is the deeper academic reference.