Why Boltzmann Brains Are Bad
Sean M. Carroll · 2017 · arXiv:1702.00850 (Caltech preprint; later in 'Current Controversies in Philosophy of Science')
This source is used as challenges evidence across 1 linked claim and 3 related evidence hubs. Its citation record is marked verified; that verifies the source trail, not the truth of any linked claim.
Summary
Argues that cosmological theories which predict you are typically a Boltzmann brain are 'cognitively unstable' — they cannot simultaneously be true and rationally believed, because the same mathematics undermines the empirical evidence used to build them.
How this source is used on the map
The standard reference for the cognitive-instability resolution and the philosophical case against taking Boltzmann-brain dominance as a real prediction.
Citation record
- Authors
- Sean M. Carroll
- Year
- 2017
- Publication
- arXiv:1702.00850 (Caltech preprint; later in 'Current Controversies in Philosophy of Science')
- Source type
- Journal article
- Map role
- challenges
- Credibility level
- primary
- Citation status
- Verified
- DOI
- Not recorded
- PubMed
- Not recorded
- Not recorded
Linked claims
Related evidence hubs
Related sources
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The default scholarly reference for what Many-Worlds actually claims and where it is contested.
The clearest statement of how the Boltzmann-brain count is tamed by a finite vacuum lifetime; companion paper to 'Return of the Boltzmann brains'.
Sets up one of the main physical pathways for resolving the paradox — vacuum decay into terminal states before BBs can dominate.
One of the canonical modern statements of the Boltzmann-brain comparison and its implications for inflation.
The paper that reignited modern interest in the Boltzmann-brain problem by linking it directly to the accelerating expansion of our universe.