Spiritual Evidence Map
Consciousness & Mind

Panpsychism

Spiritual Evidence Map/Last updated May 10, 2026/Claims v1.0.0-provisional/Sources v1.0.0/Scores provisional
Consciousness & Mind·InvestigationSources verified

Does everything have a tiny bit of inner experience?

If basic matter has a hint of experience, complex brains can build complex minds. The 'combination problem' is the catch.

01THE THEORY

The proposition, plainly stated

A theoretical proposition with empirical implications. Here's what it actually says.

The view that consciousness, in some primitive form, exists everywhere in nature — every electron, atom, and molecule has a tiny flicker of inner life. Complex minds like ours are then built up from these micro-experiences, the way complex objects are built from particles. It's an old idea recently revived in academic philosophy (Galen Strawson, Philip Goff, David Chalmers) as a way around the 'hard problem' of why physical processes feel like anything at all.

02THE CASE FOR

The strongest arguments in favour

Before examining the objections — here are the reasons thoughtful people take this seriously, regardless of where it ultimately lands.

  1. 01Strong philosophical defenses by Galen Strawson, David Chalmers, Philip Goff and others.
  2. 02Avoids the explanatory gap that physicalism faces.
  3. 03Compatible with all current physics.
03THE CASE AGAINST

The strongest objections

Now the other side. These are the most compelling reasons to remain skeptical.

  1. 01The combination problem: no satisfactory account of how micro-experiences combine.
  2. 02No empirical predictions that distinguish it from physicalism.
  3. 03Risks redefining 'experience' so broadly that the term loses content.
04Bottom line

Where this stands

Having seen the best case on both sides, here is our overall read.

Plausible but speculative

A serious live option in academic philosophy, especially after Chalmers and Goff. It elegantly side-steps the hard problem but inherits the unsolved question of how micro-experiences combine into a unified self.

Increasingly mainstream in academic philosophy, increasingly unable to solve the combination problem.
What this evidence supports

That treating proto-experience as fundamental is a coherent metaphysical move worth investigating.

What this evidence does NOT prove

That rocks have feelings in the ordinary sense, or that any spiritual interpretation follows.

05Scores

Phenomenon vs interpretation

The signature distinction. We score the underlying observation separately from the metaphysical framework usually attached to it.

Phenomenon vs Interpretation
Provisional
PhenomenonN/A

Evidence the reported observation is real.

Interpretation4/10

Evidence the bigger explanation is correct.

Evidence4/10

Headline score (defaults to phenomenon score for phenomena).

Speculation8/10

Distance between data and conclusion.

06In practice

What a thoughtful person might do with this

Take consciousness seriously as a feature of nature, not a late-arriving accident.

07Risk warning

How belief in this can go wrong

Can be misread as 'everything is conscious' in a literal way the careful version does not endorse.

08Audit trail

Audit trail

The 11 internal criteria informing the headline scores. They're not arithmetically averaged — they're the audit trail.

09Sources

Related research reports

Longer synthesis pages that place this claim inside a wider evidence cluster.

10Related

Related claims

11Sources

Sources & Further Reading

Our goal is to link to original studies, academic sources, and serious critiques wherever possible. Scores are provisional until sources are verified.

Primary sources

Philip Goff, William Seager, Sean Allen-Hermanson · 2022 · Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Philosophy referenceContextPrimaryVerified

Steel-manned version of the panpsychist position, distinct from popular caricatures.

An information integration theory of consciousness

Giulio Tononi · 2004 · BMC Neuroscience, 5, 42
Journal articleContextPrimaryVerified

A key bridge source: it is not proof of panpsychism, but it explains why some consciousness researchers treat mind-like properties as potentially graded and widespread.

Further reading

Robert Van Gulick · 2022 · Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Philosophy referenceContextPrimaryVerified

Pulls together the conceptual frameworks behind every empirical claim about consciousness.

Michael Tye · 2021 · Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Philosophy referenceContextPrimaryVerified

Defines the technical concept ('what it is like') most often invoked in disputes about consciousness.