Qualia
Michael Tye · 2021 · Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Summary
Reference entry on qualia — the felt qualities of experience that ground the hard problem of consciousness.
Why it matters here
Defines the technical concept ('what it is like') most often invoked in disputes about consciousness.
Linked claims
The materialist / physicalist view: lesions, drugs, anesthesia, and imaging all show tight brain–mind coupling, and physical mechanism explains an enormous range of phenomena. Why neural activity feels like anything at all remains the open exception.
If consciousness is basic, the 'hard problem' dissolves. The cost is a major break with the standard physicalist picture.
If basic matter has a hint of experience, complex brains can build complex minds. The 'combination problem' is the catch.
Related evidence hubs
What consciousness is, how it relates to brains, and whether it's basic to reality.
The nature of subjective experience.
Mind–brain relation, qualia, intentionality.
Cryptomnesia, anoxia models, cold reading. Counter-anchors.