Functionalism
Janet Levin · 2023 · Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
This source is used as context evidence across 2 linked claims and 4 related evidence hubs. Its citation record is marked verified; that verifies the source trail, not the truth of any linked claim.
Summary
The dominant theory of mind in contemporary philosophy: mental states are defined by their causal/functional role.
How this source is used on the map
Functionalism is the implicit metaphysics behind the case that AI could be conscious.
Citation record
- Authors
- Janet Levin
- Year
- 2023
- Publication
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- Source type
- Philosophy reference
- Map role
- context
- Credibility level
- primary
- Citation status
- Verified
- DOI
- Not recorded
- PubMed
- Not recorded
- Not recorded
Linked claims
Behaviour is not evidence of inner experience. We have no detector for consciousness in any system we did not already believe to be conscious.
The materialist / physicalist view: lesions, drugs, anesthesia, and imaging all show tight brain–mind coupling, and physical mechanism explains an enormous range of phenomena. Why neural activity feels like anything at all remains the open exception.
Related evidence hubs
What consciousness is, how it relates to brains, and whether it's basic to reality.
The nature of subjective experience.
Mind–brain relation, qualia, intentionality.
Cryptomnesia, anoxia models, cold reading. Counter-anchors.
Related research reports
Related sources
The standard sceptical argument against AI consciousness; required reading for any serious treatment.
The reference work for what 'physicalism' even means before any empirical question is asked.
Use this as the philosophical background for solipsism and for disputed minds in non-human or artificial systems. It is context, not direct evidence that any specific entity is conscious.
Pulls together the conceptual frameworks behind every empirical claim about consciousness.
Background for the strongest version of 'consciousness = brain activity', and a useful contrast with dualist, idealist, and panpsychist claims.
Defines the technical concept ('what it is like') most often invoked in disputes about consciousness.