The Mind/Brain Identity Theory
J. J. C. Smart · 2022 · Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Summary
Classic statement and modern defence of the view that mental states just are physical brain states, including identity-theory motivations and major objections.
Why it matters here
Background for the strongest version of 'consciousness = brain activity', and a useful contrast with dualist, idealist, and panpsychist claims.
Linked claims
The materialist / physicalist view: lesions, drugs, anesthesia, and imaging all show tight brain–mind coupling, and physical mechanism explains an enormous range of phenomena. Why neural activity feels like anything at all remains the open exception.
Descartes' view that mind and body are two distinct substances that somehow interact. The most intuitive position; also the one neuroscience has worked hardest to discredit.
Related evidence hubs
What consciousness is, how it relates to brains, and whether it's basic to reality.
The nature of subjective experience.
Mind–brain relation, qualia, intentionality.
Cryptomnesia, anoxia models, cold reading. Counter-anchors.