The Mind/Brain Identity Theory
J. J. C. Smart · 2022 · Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
This source is used as context evidence across 2 linked claims and 4 related evidence hubs. Its citation record is marked verified; that verifies the source trail, not the truth of any linked claim.
Summary
Classic statement and modern defence of the view that mental states just are physical brain states, including identity-theory motivations and major objections.
How this source is used on the map
Background for the strongest version of 'consciousness = brain activity', and a useful contrast with dualist, idealist, and panpsychist claims.
Citation record
- Authors
- J. J. C. Smart
- Year
- 2022
- Publication
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- Source type
- Philosophy reference
- Map role
- context
- Credibility level
- primary
- Citation status
- Verified
- DOI
- Not recorded
- PubMed
- Not recorded
- Not recorded
Linked claims
The materialist / physicalist view: lesions, drugs, anesthesia, and imaging all show tight brain–mind coupling, and physical mechanism explains an enormous range of phenomena. Why neural activity feels like anything at all remains the open exception.
Descartes' view that mind and body are two distinct substances that somehow interact. The most intuitive position; also the one neuroscience has worked hardest to discredit.
Related evidence hubs
What consciousness is, how it relates to brains, and whether it's basic to reality.
The nature of subjective experience.
Mind–brain relation, qualia, intentionality.
Cryptomnesia, anoxia models, cold reading. Counter-anchors.
Related research reports
Related sources
The reference work for what 'physicalism' even means before any empirical question is asked.
Functionalism is the implicit metaphysics behind the case that AI could be conscious.
The reference for what mind-body dualism means and why most contemporary philosophers reject it.
Pulls together the conceptual frameworks behind every empirical claim about consciousness.
Defines the technical concept ('what it is like') most often invoked in disputes about consciousness.
A strong neuroscience anchor for the brain-dependence side of the consciousness cluster, while still admitting unresolved problems.