Physicalism

The materialist / physicalist view: lesions, drugs, anesthesia, and imaging all show tight brain–mind coupling, and physical mechanism explains an enormous range of phenomena. Why neural activity feels like anything at all remains the open exception.

Physical mechanism explains an enormous range of phenomena. The qualitative character of experience is the open exception.

Descartes' view that mind and body are two distinct substances that somehow interact. The most intuitive position; also the one neuroscience has worked hardest to discredit.

What consciousness is, how it relates to brains, and whether it's basic to reality.

The nature of subjective experience.

Mind–brain relation, qualia, intentionality.

Cryptomnesia, anoxia models, cold reading. Counter-anchors.

A comparative guide to materialism, dualism, panpsychism, idealism, filter theories, and consciousness-first interpretations.

Functionalism is the implicit metaphysics behind the case that AI could be conscious.

The reference for what mind-body dualism means and why most contemporary philosophers reject it.

Pulls together the conceptual frameworks behind every empirical claim about consciousness.

Background for the strongest version of 'consciousness = brain activity', and a useful contrast with dualist, idealist, and panpsychist claims.

Defines the technical concept ('what it is like') most often invoked in disputes about consciousness.

Companion to SEP Physicalism — gives a less technical entry point.