Facing up to the problem of consciousness
David J. Chalmers · 1995 · Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2(3), 200–219
Summary
Coined 'the hard problem of consciousness' — the question of why physical processing is accompanied by subjective experience at all.
Why it matters here
The single most-cited critique of pure physicalist accounts of mind.
Linked claims
The materialist / physicalist view: lesions, drugs, anesthesia, and imaging all show tight brain–mind coupling, and physical mechanism explains an enormous range of phenomena. Why neural activity feels like anything at all remains the open exception.
If consciousness is basic, the 'hard problem' dissolves. The cost is a major break with the standard physicalist picture.
Physical mechanism explains an enormous range of phenomena. The qualitative character of experience is the open exception.
Descartes' view that mind and body are two distinct substances that somehow interact. The most intuitive position; also the one neuroscience has worked hardest to discredit.
Related evidence hubs
What consciousness is, how it relates to brains, and whether it's basic to reality.
The nature of subjective experience.
Mind–brain relation, qualia, intentionality.
Cryptomnesia, anoxia models, cold reading. Counter-anchors.