Facing up to the problem of consciousness
David J. Chalmers · 1995 · Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2(3), 200–219
This source is used as challenges evidence across 4 linked claims and 4 related evidence hubs. Its citation record is marked verified; that verifies the source trail, not the truth of any linked claim.
Summary
Coined 'the hard problem of consciousness' — the question of why physical processing is accompanied by subjective experience at all.
How this source is used on the map
The single most-cited critique of pure physicalist accounts of mind.
Citation record
- Authors
- David J. Chalmers
- Year
- 1995
- Publication
- Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2(3), 200–219
- Source type
- Journal article
- Map role
- challenges
- Credibility level
- primary
- Citation status
- Verified
- DOI
- Not recorded
- PubMed
- Not recorded
- Not recorded
Linked claims
The materialist / physicalist view: lesions, drugs, anesthesia, and imaging all show tight brain–mind coupling, and physical mechanism explains an enormous range of phenomena. Why neural activity feels like anything at all remains the open exception.
If consciousness is basic, the 'hard problem' dissolves. The cost is a major break with the standard physicalist picture.
Physical mechanism explains an enormous range of phenomena. The qualitative character of experience is the open exception.
Descartes' view that mind and body are two distinct substances that somehow interact. The most intuitive position; also the one neuroscience has worked hardest to discredit.
Related evidence hubs
What consciousness is, how it relates to brains, and whether it's basic to reality.
The nature of subjective experience.
Mind–brain relation, qualia, intentionality.
Cryptomnesia, anoxia models, cold reading. Counter-anchors.
Related research reports
A comparative guide to materialism, dualism, panpsychism, idealism, filter theories, and consciousness-first interpretations.
A balanced synthesis of the strongest and weakest evidence across afterlife, consciousness, reincarnation, mystical, psi, and practice claims.
Related sources
The reference work for what 'physicalism' even means before any empirical question is asked.
Functionalism is the implicit metaphysics behind the case that AI could be conscious.
The reference for what mind-body dualism means and why most contemporary philosophers reject it.
The reference for what 'reality is consciousness' / Berkeleyan / analytic idealism actually claims.
Pulls together the conceptual frameworks behind every empirical claim about consciousness.
Background for the strongest version of 'consciousness = brain activity', and a useful contrast with dualist, idealist, and panpsychist claims.